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We  uncover  a “paradox  of  formal  appropriability  mechanisms”  in  the  case  of  knowledge-intensive
business services  (KIBS)  ﬁrms.  Despite  evidence  that  KIBS  ﬁrms  do not  typically  consider  formal  appro-
priability  mechanisms,  such  as  patents,  to be central  mechanisms  for capturing  value  from  innovation,
we  show  that they  are nevertheless  important  for their innovation  collaboration.  Drawing  on  an  origi-
nal  survey  of  publicly-traded  UK and  US  KIBS  ﬁrms,  we  ﬁnd  a signiﬁcant  positive  association  between
the  importance  of  innovation  collaboration  and  the  importance  of  formal  appropriability  mechanisms.
We  interrogate  the evidence  for clients,  as  they  are  the  most  important  partners  for  innovation  collab-
oration.  We  ﬁnd  that  the  importance  of  innovation  collaboration  with  clients  goes  hand-in-hand  with
the  importance  of  formal  appropriability  mechanisms,  although  a negative  relation  appears  when  ﬁrms
assign  very  high  importance  to  formal  appropriability  mechanisms.  Thus,  modest  levels  of  emphasis  onnowledge-intensive services
ntellectual property rights
formal  appropriability  mechanisms  may  prevent  conﬂicts  over  ownership  of jointly  developed  knowl-
edge  assets  and  knowledge  leakages,  while  also  avoiding  the possibly  negative  effects  of  overly  strict
controls  by legal  departments  on  innovation  collaboration.  As  well  as exploring  formal  appropriabil-
ity  mechanisms,  we  also  investigate  the  relationship  between  contractual  and  strategic  appropriability
mechanisms  and  innovation  collaboration  for  KIBS  ﬁrms.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license. Introduction
Collaboration for innovation has long been the norm for ser-
ices ﬁrms (Arundel et al., 2007; Chesbrough, 2011), and especially
or knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) ﬁrms, which
ely heavily on technical or professional knowledge to solve the
roblems of their clients (Miles, 2005). Since KIBS ﬁrms create
nowledge assets regularly and jointly with external partners, they
ay  ﬁnd value capture even more challenging than ﬁrms in other
ectors. Continuous search and transfer of knowledge in collabo-
ation with external partners (and especially clients) can expose
IBS ﬁrms to regular conﬂicts in establishing and enforcing own-
rship over co-produced knowledge assets or preventing leakages
f knowledge.Evolutionary economics highlights the role of search in enabling
rms to develop new combinations of knowledge and pursue new
echnological paths (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Metcalfe, 1994).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: marcela.miozzo@mbs.ac.uk (M.  Miozzo).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.03.018
048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
An important part of search includes access to external knowl-
edge through collaboration with other organisations (Rothwell
et al., 1974; von Hippel, 1976). But there are dangers in sharing
knowledge with external partners: there is scope for uninten-
tional knowledge leakages and, indeed, imitation by competitors
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Research on ﬁrms in manufac-
turing sectors shows that appropriability mechanisms may be
employed to avoid these unwanted spillovers. Nevertheless, exces-
sive emphasis on appropriability mechanisms may  discourage
potential innovation collaborators, reducing incentives for, the
scope of, or effectiveness of innovation collaboration (Laursen
and Salter, 2014; Liebeskind, 1997). In the particular case of ser-
vices ﬁrms, however, an additional challenge concerns conﬂicts of
ownership over knowledge assets which are regularly and jointly
created with clients. To date, however, few studies of ﬁrms’ choice
of structures (including governance modes and appropriability
mechanisms) to source external knowledge and prevent unwanted
spillovers of knowledge have addressed service ﬁrms.
We draw on an original survey of 153 publicly-traded KIBS ﬁrms
in the UK and the USA. Our paper advances our understanding of
the relation between appropriability mechanisms and collabora-
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ion for innovation by KIBS ﬁrms in two main ways. First, we  argue
hat although KIBS ﬁrms do not typically consider formal appropri-
bility mechanisms (such as patents, copyrights and trademarks)
o be central mechanisms for capturing value from innovation,
hey are however important for their innovation collaboration. We
nd a signiﬁcant positive association between the importance of
nnovation collaboration and the importance of formal appropri-
bility mechanisms in general. This signiﬁcant positive association
etween the importance of innovation collaboration and that of
ormal appropriability mechanisms holds in particular consistently
or collaboration for innovation with suppliers, competitors, con-
ultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities
nd government or public research institutes. This is because for-
al  appropriability mechanisms may  facilitate collaboration for
nnovation by serving as signals of innovation capabilities, or by
roviding a framework for what knowledge is shared and what
emains private (Audretsch et al., 2012; Hagedoorn and Zober,
015).
Second, we build on earlier work showing the existence of a
oncave relation between innovation collaboration and importance
f appropriability strategies for manufacturing ﬁrms (Laursen and
alter, 2014), and extend this for KIBS ﬁrms. In particular, we ﬁnd
 signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped association between the impor-
ance of ﬁrms’ innovation collaboration with clients and that of
ormal appropriability mechanisms. The importance of innovation
ollaboration with clients goes hand-in-hand with the importance
f formal appropriability mechanisms, although a negative relation
ppears when ﬁrms assign very high importance to formal appro-
riability mechanisms. Thus, modest levels of emphasis on formal
ppropriability mechanisms may  prevent conﬂicts over ownership
f jointly developed knowledge assets and knowledge leakages,
hile also avoiding the possibly negative effects of overly strict con-
rols by legal departments on innovation collaboration. As well as
xploring formal appropriability mechanisms, we  also investigate
he relationship between contractual and strategic appropriability
echanisms and innovation collaboration for KIBS ﬁrms.
We provide next the theoretical framework of the study. After
hat, we describe the data and the methods. We then present the
ndings. Implications and conclusions follow. Finally, we  discuss
he limitations of our research.
. Theoretical framework: collaboration and
ppropriability by KIBS ﬁrms
First, we explore the peculiarities of innovation and collabora-
ion with external organisations by KIBS ﬁrms. Second, we explore
ppropriability and collaboration for innovation by KIBS ﬁrms.
.1. Innovation and collaboration by KIBS ﬁrms
There are two main difﬁculties in conceptualising innovation
y KIBS ﬁrms. First, innovation by KIBS ﬁrms is hard to analyse,
ategorise, and measure, as it often involves simultaneously new
ervices, new ways of producing and delivering services, new forms
f client interaction, and new forms of quality control and assur-
nce (den Hertog, 2000). A second complicating factor is that there
s great heterogeneity among KIBS ﬁrms regarding the way they
ndertake innovation (Miozzo and Soete, 2001; Evangelista, 2000).
IBS ﬁrms can vary from “system integrator” ﬁrms, which develop
omplex engineering or IT “solutions” that meet the needs of large
lient organisations (Davies, 2004; Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2011),
o professional services ﬁrms such as R&D, design or management
onsultancy, that help their client organisations to change in the
ourse of implementing new or improved technologies or opera-
ions (Hansen et al., 1999; Miozzo et al., 2012).cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351
Despite this heterogeneity, however, a deﬁning feature of KIBS
ﬁrms is that they are involved in the continuous creation and
transfer of knowledge in collaboration with other organisations,
especially with client organisations (Doloreaux and Shearmur,
2012; Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997; Jones et al., 1998). Also, all KIBS
ﬁrms are unusually high in terms of the share of graduate and pro-
fessional employment compared to ﬁrms in other sectors of the
economy. These graduates are trained in different knowledge areas
− some specialise in scientiﬁc and technical knowledge, others
more in administrative, managerial or socio-legal issues (European
Commission, 2004). This means that KIBS ﬁrms must adopt mea-
sures to retain these valuable high-skilled professional employees,
and prevent them from being poached by competitors.
With the exception of ﬁrms in a few science- and technology-
based sectors, KIBS ﬁrms do not typically have R&D departments.
Instead, innovations tend to be developed in the course of speciﬁc
projects for clients, and therefore are not always easy to distinguish
from the customisation of the usual service. Scholars refer to the
notion of “co-production” of knowledge with clients to denote the
way that routine work for speciﬁc clients relies on clients’ trans-
fer of (partly tacit) knowledge, and how this is intertwined with
learning and innovation on one or both sides of the relationship
(Bettencourt et al., 2002).
Drawing on surveys such as the European Innobarometer and
the Community Innovation Survey, researchers have emphasised
the importance of innovation collaboration with clients for ser-
vices ﬁrms. Among their ﬁndings is that service ﬁrms are less likely
than manufacturing ﬁrms to collaborate for innovation with uni-
versities or suppliers, but more likely to collaborate with clients
(Arundel et al., 2007). Also, service ﬁrms are less likely than manu-
facturing ﬁrms to source new technologies through in-house R&D,
through the acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment, or
through collaborations with universities and research institutes.
Instead, innovating services ﬁrms are more likely to source new
technologies through collaborations with clients and suppliers, or
through the acquisition of external intellectual property (Tether,
2005). In general, evidence from the surveys indicates that innova-
tion in services ﬁrms does not seem to follow dramatically different
paths from those displayed by manufacturing ﬁrms, but differences
appear to be more of degree than of kind.
A recent stream of research on open innovation in services
(Chesbrough, 2011) has stimulated renewed interest on collabo-
ration for innovation by services ﬁrms. Mina et al. (2014), using a
survey to study the open innovation practices of UK business ser-
vices ﬁrms, ﬁnd that they are in fact more open seekers of external
knowledge than manufacturing ﬁrms. Innovation collaboration by
business service ﬁrms tends to increase with R&D intensity and
with human capital intensity. While both clients, on the one hand,
and universities and other research organisations, on the other,
are important as a source of external knowledge for business ser-
vices, they ﬁnd, contrary to the Arundel et al. (2007) study, that
universities and public research organisations are relatively more
important. This may  be understood in the light of Love et al.’s (2011)
exploration of openness in different stages of UK business services
ﬁrms’ innovation processes: collaboration with clients is impor-
tant at the early stage, collaboration with research organisations at
the intermediate stage, and collaboration with professional associ-
ations at the exploitation stage of innovation.
Like ﬁrms in manufacturing sectors, KIBS ﬁrms seek to reduce
involuntary leakages or transfers of knowledge in the process of
innovation collaboration. But, in the case of KIBS ﬁrms, since joint
knowledge creation, especially with clients, is the norm, regular
conﬂict over ownership of the jointly-developed knowledge assets
may  be more likely. The services provider is likely to want to repli-
cate the solution, process, or design in projects with other clients;
the client might want to use it in its own other activities, and may
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ant to prevent it from being offered to its competitors (Leiponen,
008). For example, a study of IT services found evidence of cases
here IT services providers also provided services to ﬁrms in direct
ompetition with their existing clients; this led to client ﬁrms fear-
ng knowledge leakages and the replication of IT systems that had
elivered them a competitive edge (Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2005).
he study stressed the need for frequent discussion, negotiation
nd re-negotiation to reconcile objectives and interests between
he client and KIBS ﬁrm, and to institutionalise processes for man-
ging such conﬂicts over intellectual property rights.
In particular, the insight that innovations are developed in the
ourse of speciﬁc projects with clients provides a rationale to sin-
le out in our analysis collaboration with clients from collaboration
ith other external organisations. We  suggest that working with
lients may  require KIBS ﬁrms to pay extra attention to their appro-
riability strategy in the face of conﬂicting objectives. KIBS ﬁrms
ay  not only be concerned about knowledge leakages in innova-
ion collaboration with external organisations, but also experience
onﬂicts in establishing ownership over jointly-created knowl-
dge assets with clients. KIBS ﬁrms and their clients may  have
ifferent objectives, with KIBS ﬁrms wanting to replicate the inno-
ations developed jointly with a particular client with other clients,
nd clients being concerned about KIBS ﬁrms’ offering the jointly-
eveloped innovation to their competitors.
.2. Collaboration and appropriability by KIBS ﬁrms
While the relationship between external innovation collab-
ration and appropriability strategy has received considerable
ttention in the context of manufacturing ﬁrms, this has been less
xplored for KIBS ﬁrms. There are two polar positions in the liter-
ture examining the relation between appropriablity strategy and
nnovation collaboration for manufacturing ﬁrms. On the one hand,
ne group argues that appropriability mechanisms can help het-
rogeneous partners collaborate for innovation and that, in strong
ppropriability regimes (where imitation is difﬁcult either because
f strong formal appropriability mechanisms or difﬁcult-to-imitate
echnology), ﬁrms are more willing to collaborate for innovation
Pisano and Teece, 2007; Graham and Mowery, 2006). On the other
and, there are those who argue that innovation collaboration may
e facilitated when ﬁrms deliberately reduce their use of some of
heir intellectual property rights (Chesbrough 2003; von Hippel and
on Krogh, 2006). In support of the latter position, both Henkel et al.
2014) and Alexy et al. (2009) note that revealing freely or “selec-
ively” core technologies can draw more users into ﬁrms’ product
cosystems.
Firms typically protect rents due to innovation by using a range
f appropriability mechanisms, including patents, copyrights,
rademarks, design rights, conﬁdentiality agreements, secrecy,
mployment contracts, lead-time advantages, complexity of prod-
ct/process, and complementary assets. Although patents have
een the main focus of attention on debates on innovation
ncentives, these tend to be the least emphasised appropriability
echanisms in most manufacturing sectors, with ﬁrms emphasis-
ng more heavily secrecy and lead-time advantages (Cohen et al.,
000; Hall et al., 2014; Leiponen and Byma, 2009).1
1 The importance of patents, however, has been increasing compared to earlier
urveys (see Levin et al., 1987). Firms often patent for reasons other than proﬁting
rom a patented innovation through its commercialisation or licensing. In addition to
reventing copying, the most important reasons to patent include preventing com-
etitors from patenting related inventions (“patent blocking”), forcing competitors
nto negotiations, and preventing lawsuits (Cohen et al., 2000). The broad role of
atents was  already envisaged in a historical study of the chemical industry, where
rora (1997) shows that how patents are used (or not used) affects opportunities
or entry, industry structure and the rate of technological change itself.cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351 1339
Formal appropriability mechanisms, including patents, may
facilitate innovation collaboration by providing a framework for
what knowledge is shared and what remains private. Hagedoorn
and Zober (2015) report on a survey of ﬁrms active in innovation
collaboration: 90% of ﬁrms regarded patents, 86% trade secrets, 71%
trademarks, and 64% design rights as the most important instru-
ments for protecting the innovative capabilities of ﬁrms from their
innovation partners. Approprability mechanisms can also facilitate
the ﬂow of the tacit component of knowledge—for example, when
clauses of assistance and/or exchange of employees are included in
licensing contracts (Foray, 2004).
Appropriability mechanisms can also signal innovative capa-
bilities to potential partners. Having control over particular and
valuable knowledge assets helps partners to identify each other,
and can alert potential users as to the availability of the technol-
ogy. For example, some ﬁrms are known to screen patent databases
to identify potential partners for collaboration (Alexy et al., 2009;
Audretsch et al., 2012). Also, possessing technical and commercial
information in the form of trade secrets is considered an impor-
tant signal of innovation capabilities (Hagedoorn and Zober, 2015).
This signalling dimension of appropriability mechanisms is all the
more important because ﬁrms operate with incomplete informa-
tion regarding other ﬁrms’ activities and innovative capabilities,
and the value of their innovations.
Nevertheless, even when particular appropriability mecha-
nisms contribute to external innovation collaboration, placing high
levels of emphasis on them can be harmful for collaboration. Using
panel data from three successive waves of a large-scale survey of UK
manufacturing ﬁrms, Laursen and Salter (2014) ﬁnd a concave rela-
tion between ﬁrms’ breadth of external search and collaboration for
innovation, and the strength of the ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies.
The authors explain the negative consequences of placing heavy
emphasis on formal appropriability and innovation collaboration
on the basis of strict controls by legal departments of collaborative
relationships, complex organisational processes in place for getting
approval for joint projects, conﬂicts over ownership of intellectual
property, and complex inter-organisational negotiations damaging
trust. Similarly, heavy emphasis on secrecy has been shown to cause
discontent among employees, inhibit learning, and restrict oppor-
tunities for innovation collaboration (Liebeskind, 1997). Indeed,
imposing restrictive secrecy rules cause loss of trust, and exces-
sive use of security rules and monitoring procedures incurs labour
and material costs.
There is some evidence that formal appropriability mechanisms
are even less important for capturing value for services ﬁrms than
for manufacturing ﬁrms (Hipp, 2008; Miles et al., 2000). Not only
is the product of service innovation in many cases not suitable for
patenting, but also KIBS ﬁrms’ innovations may  require less upfront
investment (for many KIBS – but not all – there is no need for large
R&D labs, engineering teams, costly equipment, and expensive clin-
ical trials). Service innovation can be difﬁcult to copy, for example,
because of reliance on the input of highly-skilled and experienced
professionals (Samuelson, 2010).
While much innovative output from services ﬁrms can not be
effectively protected by patents, since the 1990s, patents have
been applicable to some aspects of computer software in most
economies (Hall and MacGarvie, 2006). There have been histor-
ical swings in the patentability of business methods (including
auction methods, e-commerce techniques, and banking and ﬁnan-
cial services methods), with a more restrictive approach to their
patentability since the late 1990s (Andersen and Howells, 2000).
The copyright system has long been applied to published works:
its application to innovative activity is much more recent and ill-
deﬁned, though copyright ofﬁces in most countries have accepted
registration of computer programs since the mid-1960s. The less
important role of patents in capturing value from innovation for
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two-stage cluster sampling design. The primary sampling units are
ﬁrms, and the secondary sampling units are their portfolios of
product or process innovations.6 Because some ﬁrms introduced
2 These include ﬁrms operating in the following sectors: telecommunications,
ﬁnancial intermediation and auxiliary activities, research and development, legal
services, accounting, book-keeping and auditing, tax consultancy, market research
and public opinion polling, business and management consultancy, management
activities of holding companies, architectural and engineering activities and related
technical consultancy, and technical testing and analysis. The ﬁrst two of this list
have substantial consumer markets, and thus are usually excluded from business
services though labelled knowledge-intensive services; since they are essential
for business activities, they are often described as belonging to the category of
“business-related services”.
3 We use Cochran’s sample size formula (Cochran, 1977) to determine the ade-
quacy of our sample size. As our key variables are constructed from a ﬁve-point
scale (as illustrated later in the section about variables) and we set an alpha level
of 0.1 and the acceptable level of error at 5%, the required sample size is around 68.
Therefore, our achieved sample size is adequate for regression analysis.
4 Eisen et al. (2012) provide a detailed empirical example of the application of
inverse response propensity weights to adjust non-response bias for survey analysis.
5 The advantage of using this weighting method for the adjustment of non-
response bias (compared to post-stratiﬁcation weighting for instance) is that any
continuous variable that are associated with non-responses (such as the number
of  employees) can also be adjusted without assigning them to somewhat arbitrary
categories.340 M. Miozzo et al. / Researc
ervices compared to manufacturing ﬁrms is currently challenged
y Mina et al. (2014), who ﬁnd that the use of patents is as impor-
ant for business services as for manufacturing ﬁrms, and is more
mportant than strategic appropriability mechanisms.
Thus, a further issue is that services ﬁrms, including KIBS, are
rgued to use mechanisms other than formal appropriability mech-
nisms to protect their knowledge. There is some evidence that
hey attempt to capture value from innovation mainly through con-
racts, secrecy, and a variety of strategic mechanisms, including
ead-time advantages, making intangible products more tangi-
le (e.g. embedding software in microchips), creating lock-in
ffects (such as offering bounded value-for-money services, loy-
lty cards, and, in the case of software and IT services, providing
asy interoperability), and building entry barriers (such as the
nstitutionalisation of professional qualiﬁcations and accredita-
ion systems) (Greenwood et al., 2005; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and
itala, 2010; Miles et al., 2000).
Contracts with clients and other organisations are not only an
mportant mechanism to capture value from innovation but also to
ead off conﬂicts in innovation collaboration by KIBS ﬁrms, or at
east of limiting how far they escalate. The case of the collaboration
etween the IT services provider EDS (now part of HP) and the aero-
ngine ﬁrm Rolls Royce in a “business transformation programme”,
ight be instructive. EDS provided a range of innovative IT ser-
ices to Rolls Royce, including IT support for product development,
anufacturing processes, supply-chain management, and repair
nd overhaul. To facilitate knowledge transfer and avoid conﬂicts
ver jointly-developed knowledge assets, the ﬁrms signed a com-
lex contract with shared costs and proﬁts (Miozzo and Grimshaw,
005). Other studies also underline the importance of complex con-
racts between knowledge-intensive services suppliers and their
lients in joint innovation collaboration (Massini and Miozzo, 2012;
iozzo and Grimshaw, 2011).
Similarly, Leiponen (2008) explores the role of exclusive
rrangements, preventing knowledge-intensive services suppliers
rom servicing the clients’ competitors. She shows that large and
owerful clients prefer tighter control over jointly-created knowl-
dge, although they might beneﬁt more from providing greater
ncentives for fast knowledge creation by knowledge-intensive ser-
ices suppliers rather than from tight control.
Thus, in order to enrich our understanding of how the choices of
IBS ﬁrms to collaborate for innovation with external partners are
elated to their appropriability strategies, this paper presents the
esults of exploratory research. We  explore the relation between
he importance of innovation collaboration and that of different
ypes of appropriability mechanisms. Building on existing work
Greenwood et al., 2005; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Ritala, 2010;
iles et al., 2000), we consider different types of appropriability
echanisms that are relevant to KIBS ﬁrms: formal, contractual
nd strategic. We  also build on previous work on innovation col-
aboration and appropriability carried out for manufacturing ﬁrms
Laursen and Salter, 2014). Nevertheless, we expect that some fea-
ures that are “heightened” in KIBS ﬁrms, such as the emphasis on
ighly-skilled and experienced professionals, and the importance
f the interaction with clients for innovation, may  affect the relation
etween the choice among (and levels of emphasis on) different
ppropriability mechanisms and that of innovation collaboration
ith external partners.. Data and methods
We  draw on an original survey administered through telephone
nterviews between September and December 2012. The sampling
rame is the UK and US publicly-traded knowledge-intensive ser-cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351
vice ﬁrms listed in Datastream.2 The UK and USA have relatively
similar business and innovation systems, and legal frameworks
for intellectual property protection; knowledge-intensive business
services account for a large percentage of GDP in both countries.
The initial list comprises 406 UK and 1892 US ﬁrms. The respon-
dents were in senior managerial positions, including CEO, CFO, head
of marketing, head of communications, head of business develop-
ment, and technical project manager. The survey resulted in 223
responses (92 UK and 131 US ﬁrms).3 The overall response rate is
10.3%, which is comparable to several previous studies (e.g. Mina
et al., 2014). However, the response rates are signiﬁcantly differ-
ent in the UK and the US (23% and 7% respectively). Appendix
Table A1 shows details of the assessment of the survey’s non-
response bias using the characteristic comparison method (Lawton
and Parasuraman, 1980), which compares respondents and non-
respondents by country, ﬁrm size (number of employees) and
industrial sector (2-digit SIC code): UK ﬁrms and large ﬁrms are
over-represented in the ﬁnal sample.
The biases in favour of UK ﬁrms and large ﬁrms require the use of
appropriate weight adjustment techniques (e.g., Love et al., 2011).
We assign underrepresented groups of respondents higher weights
compared with overrepresented groups in our regression, based on
the inverse response propensity as assessed using logistic regres-
sion modelling (David et al., 1983; Kalton and Flores-Cervantes,
2003).4 Indeed, we regress whether each of the 406 UK and 1892
US ﬁrms responded to our survey (yes = 1 and no = 0) on variables
capturing auxiliary ﬁrm information about ﬁrm size (the number of
employees) and country of origin (US or UK). The reciprocal of each
ﬁrm’s propensity to respond to the survey is then used to weight
observations on each sample ﬁrm.5
The unit of analysis in the regressions is the portfolio of either
product or process innovations that were introduced by our sam-
ple ﬁrms between 2009 and 2011 (see the description of the
dependent variables below). During the survey period, a ﬁrm may
introduce both product and process innovations. In such a case,
for the ﬁrm, two  units of innovations (i.e. product innovations
and process innovations) are used for the analysis. We  adopt a6 The sample is self-weighted in that all the sampling frame ﬁrms were contacted
and  for each ﬁrm that responded, its portfolios of product or process innovations
were surveyed. Therefore, weights are given only to adjust for non-response bias
(because of the sampling design, the sample does not have to be weighted). As there
is  no information available at the innovation level about the survey population,
non-response bias is adjusted at ﬁrm level.
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vation or not (product innovation = 1 and process innovation = 0).
Additionally, we  control for other variables, including whether the
ﬁrm is located in the USA (USA = 1 and UK = 0), ﬁrm size (log of the
number of employees) and the type of sector in which the ﬁrm
9 Secrecy is typically classiﬁed as a strategic appropriability mechanism, but the
factor analysis groups it together with conﬁdentiality agreements and employ-M. Miozzo et al. / Researc
oth product and process innovations over the same period, we use
he Huber-White cluster-robust standard error estimator (Rogers,
993; White, 1980; Williams, 2000) in order to adjust for intra-ﬁrm
orrelation and ensure consistent inference. Furthermore, using
 robust heteroscedasticity-consistent (rather than the standard
LS) estimator, we account for the presence of heteroscedasticity
f unknown form (White, 1980).
The relationship between the importance of innovation collab-
ration and that of appropriability mechanisms is analysed using
ultiple regression analysis (adjusted by country and ﬁrm size).
he analysis was carried out using STATA 10. The ﬁnal sample in
he analysis comprises 233 product and process innovations, clus-
ered into 153 innovating ﬁrms (i.e., the analysis is conducted using
rms which introduced at least one innovation during the period
009–2011). There are two reasons for this research design. First,
or each portfolio of product or process innovations, we asked each
espondent to give scores regarding the signiﬁcance of the various
ypes of appropriability mechanisms to protect the speciﬁc group
f innovations. This enables us to distinguish whether product and
rocess innovations are protected differently.7 Second, if a ﬁrm had
ntroduced no innovations during the survey period, there would
e no reason to ask how the ﬁrm protected its innovation.
.1. Dependent variables
Following the questions used in the Community Innovation Sur-
ey, we asked ﬁrm representatives whether the ﬁrm cooperated
ith each of the following partners for innovation: (1) clients or
ustomers, (2) suppliers, (3) competitors, (4) consultants, com-
ercial labs, or private R&D institutes, (5) universities, and (6)
overnment or public research institutes. We  also asked them to
core from 1 to 5 how important the partner is for the ﬁrm’s creation
f innovation (when the ﬁrm did not collaborate with a particular
ype of partner, a score of zero is awarded). We  chose to single
ut clients because of the important role attached to innovation
ollaboration with clients in the existing literature (Bettencourt
t al., 2002; den Hertog, 2000; Arundel et al., 2007). This means
hat scores for the importance of collaboration for innovation for
lients – integers ranging from 0 to 5 – are used as dependent vari-
bles for a set of regressions. Furthermore, we follow the approach
f Amara et al. (2008) and created an extra variable ‘importance of
nnovation collaboration with all other partners’, using the average
f the scores of perceived importance of suppliers, competitors,
onsultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universi-
ies and government or public research institutes (i.e. partner types
–6) for innovation ( = 0.55),8 as an additional dependent variable
or the assessment of the relationship between ﬁrms’ appropriabil-
ty strategies and the importance of innovation collaboration with
ther partners regardless of whether ﬁrms collaborate with clients
r not. This index therefore measures the aggregate level of impor-
ance of innovation collaboration with suppliers, competitors,
onsultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities
nd government or public research institutes, without differentiat-
ng by partner type. The values of the composite index that captures
he average importance of collaboration with these external part-
ers can range from 0 to 5, and are not necessarily integers.
.2. Explanatory variablesFor each portfolio of product or process innovations, we asked
espondents to give a score from 1 to 5 indicating how signiﬁcant
ach of several mechanisms has been in protecting this speciﬁc
7 Many innovation surveys ask about product and process innovations, but then
o  not request information speciﬁc to these.
8 A Cronbach’s  value of 0.5 is acceptable for short item scales (Bowling, 2002).cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351 1341
portfolio from copying or imitation by competitors or for otherwise
capturing value from their ﬁrm’s innovations. The mechanisms
are: (1) patents (excluding business method patents), (2) busi-
ness method patents, (3) copyrights, (4) trademarks, (5) design
rights, (6) conﬁdentiality agreements, (7) employment contracts,
(8) secrecy, (9) lead-time advantages, (10) complexity of the service
or service process, and (11) complementary service development
and delivery capabilities (this list follows the Community Innova-
tion Survey, but includes additional appropriability mechanisms).
Responses were factor analysed, using principal component anal-
ysis as the extraction method, Varimax as the rotation method,
and retaining factors that explain more than 70% of the variance as
factor selection criteria. Three types of signiﬁcant appropriability
orientations were identiﬁed as a result (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin mea-
sure of sampling adequacy = 0.864) (Table 1), and factor scores for
each orientation are calculated by regression methods. The three
orientations towards appropriability mechanisms are labelled ‘for-
mal’, ‘contractual’ and ‘strategic’. A formal orientation emphasises
the signiﬁcance of patents, copyrights, trademarks and design
rights to capture value from innovation by ﬁrms. A contractual
orientation highlights the signiﬁcance of conﬁdentiality agree-
ments, employment contracts, and secrecy to capture value from
innovation.9 A strategic orientation stresses the importance of lead-
time advantages, complexity of the service or service process, and
complementary service development and delivery capabilities to
capture value from innovation. Appendix Table A2 provides further
information on data validity. Also, in light of previous research that
identiﬁes a concave relation between the importance of innovation
collaboration and that of different levels of emphasis on appro-
priability mechanisms (Laursen and Salter, 2014), we introduce
squared terms of the three types of appropriability orientations.
3.3. Control variables
We include a number of control variables suggested as rele-
vant by the literature. First, a ﬁrm’s R&D investments may  affect its
capacity to absorb external knowledge (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal,
1990), thus we construct the index ‘R&D investments’based on a
survey question following the Community Innovation Survey. The
question asked respondents whether they spent, for the year 2011,
more than 1% of their turnover in support of innovation on each
of the following activities: (1) conducting R&D internally (yes = 1
and no = 0), (2) acquisition of machinery, equipment and software
(yes = 1 and no = 0), (3) training for innovative activities (yes = 1 and
no = 0), and (4) all forms of design (yes = 1 and no = 0). We  use the
average of the standardised item scores ( = 0.66). Second, as prod-
uct or process innovation inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s collaboration with
different types of partners (Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), we
include in the model whether the innovation is a product inno-ment contracts; so we call this group for simplicity ‘contractual appropriability
mechanisms’. Nevertheless, there are indeed some “contractual” aspects of secrecy.
Although there are trade secrets laws which legally forbid employees of a ﬁrm to
provide outsiders with documents connected to the business of the ﬁrm, unlike for-
mal  appropriability mechanisms such as patents, trade secrets laws do not protect
against competitors using “fair” means to replicate the knowledge, protection does
not extend to non-codiﬁed knowledge, and infringement is difﬁcult to prosecute
unless the employee has entered into an explicit contract of trade secrets with the
ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm has made efforts to safeguard the secrecy of the piece of knowledge
concerned (Liebeskind, 1997).
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Fig. 1. Partners with which ﬁrms cooperate for innovation (%) (N = 153; weighted results).
Note: The survey question asked each ﬁrm that had introduced innovations whether the ﬁrm cooperated with each of the various partners for innovation.
Fig. 2. Mean scores of signiﬁcance of appropriability mechanisms (N = 233; weighted results).
Note: The survey question asked each ﬁrm that had introduced innovations, for each portfolio of (product or process) innovations, to score from 1 to 5 how signiﬁcant each
of  several mechanisms has been in protecting this speciﬁc group of innovation from copying or imitation by competitors or for otherwise capturing value from their ﬁrms’
innovation.
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Table  1
Factor analysis results.
Items Rotated factor loadings
Formal appropriability
mechanisms
Contractual appropriability
mechanisms
Strategic appropriability
mechanisms
Patents 0.80 0.00 0.36
Business method patents 0.83 0.02 0.31
Copyrights 0.82 0.36 0.04
Trademarks 0.77 0.48 0.00
Design rights 0.74 0.38 0.14
Conﬁdentiality agreements 0.23 0.80 0.27
Secrecy 0.23 0.72 0.34
Employment contracts 0.21 0.76 0.29
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Complexity of service product/process/design 0.14 
Complementary service development and delivery capabilities 0.20 
perates (seven industry dummies using the ﬁrms’ primary 2-digit
IC code).
The objective of this paper is to explore the association between
he importance of innovation collaboration with external part-
ers and that of different appropriability mechanisms. The nature
f this study is exploratory; we intend to uncover associations,
ather than to establish casual relationships between the nominally
ependent and independent variables. Hence, we  do not imply that
rms decide on what appropriability mechanisms to use and then
hether to seek (certain) external partners for innovation. Nor do
e claim the reverse: that ﬁrms decide ﬁrst about their choice of
ollaboration strategy and then decide about their appropriability
trategy. Both are possible in principle, and ﬁrm strategies almost
nevitably evolve over time. The relation between the two sets of
ariables is likely to be determined by a number of factors, including
he nature of the service, the types of innovations introduced, the
apabilities of the ﬁrm, the type of knowledge required for innova-
ion, and the type of sector. In particular, results may  be inﬂuenced
y the self-selection of appropriability and collaboration strategies
y “high-quality” ﬁrms (Laursen and Salter, 2014). Consequently,
urther steps were taken to enhance the robustness of the analysis.
e adopted two indicators of ﬁrm “quality”. One indicator of qual-
ty is the number of innovations introduced by the sample ﬁrms. We
hus asked respondents to state the number of products and pro-
ess innovations their ﬁrms introduced between 2009 and 2011.
 second indicator is the growth rate of the ﬁrms’ total assets (in
housand US dollars) over the three-year period (2009–2011) up to
he year of the survey (e.g., Weinzimmer et al., 1998). Firm growth
ate is calculated from the difference in total assets between 2011
nd 2009, divided by the value of total assets in 2009 and multiplied
y 100.
. Findings
.1. Descriptive statistics
Strikingly, the survey shows that the sample ﬁrms collaborate
xtensively for innovation. Cooperation with clients/customers is
he most important type of collaboration in the innovation process,
ith 87% of ﬁrms cooperating with this type of partner (Fig. 1).
uppliers of materials, equipment or software are the second most
mportant partners in the innovation process, with 65% of ﬁrms
ooperating with this type of partner. This is followed by coopera-
ion with consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes
58% of ﬁrms), competitors (49%), universities or other higher
ducation institutions (34%), and government or public research
nstitutes (29%).
Regarding the relative signiﬁcance of each appropriability
echanism, conﬁdentiality agreements, secrecy, employment con-
racts, complementary capabilities and complexity in service0.28 0.74
0.18 0.83
0.43 0.73
design are perceived to be amongst the most important means
of capturing value from innovation (Fig. 2). According to our
respondents, formal appropriability mechanisms are less impor-
tant than contractual or strategic appropriability mechanisms. In
fact, patents were the least important of all the methods considered
for capturing value from innovation.
4.2. Regression analysis
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics and correlation
coefﬁcients among the variables. Table 4 presents the regression
results using cluster-robust estimators (which take into account
intra-ﬁrm correlation) for both the full speciﬁcation, and a reduced
version without the squared terms, in order to assess whether the
estimated effects behave consistently in the two speciﬁcations. The
inclusion of the squared terms improves the ﬁt of our model to the
data in the regressions of collaboration with clients, as reﬂected in
the F-test for the change in R-squared between the reduced and the
full speciﬁcation.
To assess the risk of multicollinearity in the regression analysis,
we calculated the variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) among the pre-
dictor variables for the two  full speciﬁcation models. The maximum
estimated VIF across our explanatory variables for both models
was 4.87 and the mean value was  1.86, which are well below the
recommended ceiling of 10 (Wooldridge, 2000).
Following Shugart et al. (2005), we use graphical represen-
tations of the predicted results with 90% conﬁdence intervals
to interpret regression results from the nonlinear models. The
approach is useful for the interpretation of speciﬁc effects in cases in
which coefﬁcients of relevant variables from the regression results
are not all statistically signiﬁcant in nonlinear models.
Four key ﬁndings emerge from the regression results. First,
despite previous evidence from existing literature and our sur-
vey that formal appropriability mechanisms are less relevant for
capturing value from innovation by KIBS ﬁrms than contractual
or strategic mechanisms, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive associa-
tion between the importance of innovation collaboration and the
importance of formal appropriability mechanisms in general. This
signiﬁcant positive association between the importance of innova-
tion collaboration and that of formal appropriability mechanisms
holds in particular consistently for collaboration for innovation
with all other partners (i.e. suppliers, competitors, consultants,
commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities, and gov-
ernment or public research institutes) (see Table 4 and Figs. 3 and 4).
Second, there is however a maximum limit, or a turning point,
to the positive association between the importance of innovation
with clients and the importance of formal appropriability mecha-
nisms. We  ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped relation between
the importance of ﬁrms’ innovation collaboration with clients and
that of formal appropriability mechanisms (column 2 in Table 4). As
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for variables (weighted results).
Variables Type of variables Description Mean Std. Dev.
Firm level
Importance of innovation collaboration
Importance of innovation collaboration
with clients
Scores; continuous Scores from 1 to 5 how important clients are
for the ﬁrm’s creation of innovation (when the
ﬁrm did not collaborate with clients, a score of
zero is awarded).
3.67 1.68
Importance of innovation collaboration
with all other partners
Index: 5 items
(Cronbach’s alpha value = 0.55)
Scores from 1 to 5 how important the
following partners are for the ﬁrm’s creation of
innovation (when the ﬁrm did not collaborate
with clients, a score of zero is awarded)
1.56 1.00
1)  suppliers
2) competitors
3) consultants, commercial labs, or private
R&D institutes
4) universities
5) government or public research
institutes.
R&D investments Index: 4 items
(Cronbach’s alpha value = 0.66)
Whether respondents spent, for the year 2011,
more than 1% of their turnover in support of
innovation on each of the following activities
0.17 0.66
1)  conducting R&D internally (yes = 1 and
no = 0)
2) acquisition of machinery, equipment
and software (yes = 1 and no = 0)
3) training for innovative activities (yes = 1
and no = 0)
4) all forms of design (yes = 1 and no = 0).
Number of employees (log) Continuous log of the number of employees 5.68 2.16
Firm  growth rate Continuous (%) The difference in total assets between 2011
and 2009, divided by the value of total assets in
2009 and multiplied by 100
77.78 382.84
US  ﬁrm Categorical Whether the ﬁrm is located in the USA (yes = 1
and no = 0)
0.82 0.38
Groups of innovation level
Orientation to formal appropriability
mechanisms
Index: factor scores from
regression methods
Factor analysis results; see Table 1 0.11 0.98
Orientation to contractual
appropriability mechanisms
Index: factor scores from
regression methods
Factor analysis results; see Table 1 −0.03 0.98
Orientation to strategic appropriability
mechanisms
Index: factor scores from
regression methods
Factor analysis results; see Table 1 −0.05 0.98
Product innovation Categorical Whether the innovation is a product
innovation (yes = 1 and no = 0)
0.59 0.49
Number of innovations Continuous The number of product or process innovations
introduced between 2009 and 2011
6.78 24.64
N  = 233
Table 3
Correlation Table (weighted results).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Importance of innovation collaboration with clients 1.00
2.  Importance of innovation collaboration with other partners 0.26*** 1.00
3.  Orientation to formal appropriability mechanisms 0.22*** 0.25*** 1.00
4.  Orientation to contractual appropriability mechanisms 0.19*** 0.12** 0.00 1.00
5.  Orientation to strategic appropriability mechanisms 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00
6.  R&D investments 0.12* 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.28*** 1.00
7.  Product innovation 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 1.00
8.  Number of innovations 0.07 0.08 −0.13 0.12 −0.11 −0.06 0.02 1.00
9.  Number of employees (log) 0.14** 0.25*** 0.13* 0.22*** 0.01 −0.05 −0.00 0.16 1.00
10.  Firm growth rate 0.08 0.07 0.17 −0.00 0.08* 0.14 −0.03 −0.01 −0.22* 1.00
11.  US ﬁrm 0.09 0.17*** 0.29*** −0.04 −0.03 0.12* −0.03 −0.14* −0.15** 0.08 1.00
c
a
0
T* signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.an be seen from Fig. 4, the turning point of the curve occurs when
 ﬁrm’s orientation to formal appropriability mechanism is about
.64, which is above the mean level of the variable of 0.11 (Table 2).
his suggests that initially the importance of innovation collabora-tion with clients goes hand-in-hand with the importance of formal
appropriability mechanisms, but a negative relation appears when
ﬁrms assign very high importance to formal appropriability mech-
anisms.
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Table  4
Regression analysis (weighted results).
Dependent variable
Importance of innovation collaboration with
clients
Importance of innovation collaboration with all
other partners
Coef. (Robust Std. Err.) Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal  0.37* 0.50** 0.27** 0.26**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11)
Formal  squared −0.39** −0.04
(0.17) (0.10)
Contractual 0.17 0.21 0.02 0.01
(0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
Contractual squared −0.15 −0.10*
(0.13) (0.05)
Strategic −0.08 −0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.19) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09)
Strategic squared 0.19* 0.04
(0.10) (0.06)
R&D  investments 0.25 0.28 0.34** 0.35**
(0.26) (0.24) (0.13) (0.14)
Product  innovation 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Number  of innovations 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number  of employees (log) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm  growth rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
USA  −0.04 −0.11 0.07 0.07
(0.39) (0.39) (0.19) (0.19)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.89*** 3.10*** 0.91** 1.00**
(0.94) (0.90) (0.42) (0.43)
R squared 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.21
F-test  for model 2.90*** 3.06*** 4.59*** 3.92***
F-test for R squared change 2.87** 1.28
N  observations 233 233 233 233
Note: (1) Main effects model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with clients’ as the dependent variable.
(2)  Full speciﬁcation model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with clients’ as the dependent variable.
(3)  Main effects model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners’ as the dependent variable.
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* signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Third, regression results suggest a signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped
elation between the importance of innovation collaboration with
ll other partners and the importance of contractual appropriability
echanisms (column 4 in Table 4). Fig. 5 depicts this relation-
hip: the importance of innovation collaboration peaks around the
ean importance of contractual appropriability mechanisms. Our
esults suggest that the importance of innovation collaboration
ises initially with the importance of contractual appropriability
echanisms, but declines when ﬁrms’ emphasis on contractual
ppropriability mechanisms exceeds the mean value. Thus, high
evels of emphasis on contractual appropriability mechanisms are
ssociated with a decreasing importance of innovation collabora-
ion with partner organisations other than clients. We  treat this
nding with caution, however. Although we obtain a signiﬁcant
egative coefﬁcient for the importance of contractual appropriabil-
ty mechanisms squared, the inclusion of the squared terms does
ot improve signiﬁcantly the overall ﬁt of our model to the data in
he regression of collaboration with all other partners (see F-test
or the change in R-squared).artners’ as the dependent variable.
Fourth, we  ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient for the squared
term of the importance of strategic appropriability mechanisms in
the regression model where the dependent variable is the impor-
tance of collaboration with clients (column 2 in Table 4). Thus,
innovation collaboration with clients is more important when ﬁrms
place either low or high levels of emphasis on strategic appropri-
ability mechanisms. This U-shaped relation is depicted in Fig. 6.
Again, however, this result should be treated with caution due to
the wide 90% conﬁdence intervals at low and high levels of empha-
sis on strategic appropriability mechanisms.
Finally, our results show that there is a signiﬁcant positive asso-
ciation between higher R&D investments and the importance of
innovation collaboration with other external partners (suppliers,
competitors, consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D insti-
tutes, universities and government or public research institutes).
This ﬁnding is in line with the existing literature (e.g., Laursen
and Salter, 2014; Mina et al., 2014), and therefore increases our
conﬁdence in the survey results.
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Fig. 3. Association between predicted importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners and emphasis on formal appropriability mechanisms.
Note: (1) Grey area indicates 90% conﬁdence intervals. (2) The group ‘all other partners’ includes suppliers, competitors, consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D
institutes, universities, and government or public research institutes.
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. Discussion and conclusions
Our study contributes to the understanding of the relation
etween collaboration for innovation and appropriability strat-
gy for knowledge-intensive business services ﬁrms in several
ays. First, our ﬁndings uncover a “paradox of formal appropri-
bility mechanisms” in the case of KIBS ﬁrms. On the one hand,s and emphasis on formal appropriability mechanisms.
both the existing literature and our own  sample ﬁrms show that
KIBS ﬁrms do not regard formal appropriability mechanisms as
the most effective methods for protecting their innovations from
copying or imitation by competitors, or for otherwise capturing
value from their innovation (Andersen and Howells, 2000; Hipp,
2008; Samuelson, 2010). On the other hand, however, our research
reveals a positive association between the importance of formal
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Fig. 5. Association between predicted importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners and emphasis on contractual appropriability mechanisms.
Note:  (1) Grey area indicates 90% conﬁdence intervals. (2) The group ‘all other partners’ includes suppliers, competitors, consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D
institutes, universities, and government or public research institutes.
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ppropriability mechanisms and that of innovation collaboration
y KIBS ﬁrms. This suggests that for KIBS ﬁrms, for which joint
nowledge creation and transfer, especially with clients, is the
orm (Bettencourt et al., 2002; den Hertog, 2000), the use of formal
ppropriability mechanisms can facilitate knowledge exchange, by
roviding a clear framework for what is shared and what is private
nowledge.s and emphasis on strategic appropriability mechanisms.
Second, our research builds on earlier work showing the exis-
tence of a concave relation between innovation collaboration and
importance of appropriability strategies for manufacturing ﬁrms
(Laursen and Salter, 2014), and extends this for KIBS ﬁrms. We  ﬁnd
that the importance of innovation collaboration with clients goes
hand-in-hand with the importance of formal appropriability mech-
anisms, although a negative relation appears when ﬁrms assign
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ery high importance to formal appropriability mechanisms. Col-
aboration for innovation with clients is crucial both at the early
tage of the creation of innovation (Love et al., 2011) and at the
nal stage of project implementation (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lehrer
t al., 2013). It may  be the case that modest levels of emphasis
n formal appropriability mechanisms may  prevent conﬂicts over
wnership of co-produced knowledge assets and knowledge leak-
ges (or even provide signals for potential partners).
Our results are also consistent with the view that very high
evels of emphasis on these mechanisms can act as a barrier to
mportant knowledge exchanges (especially regarding partly tacit
nowledge) at the stages of the project deﬁnition and implemen-
ation required for the development of innovation by KIBS ﬁrms
n the course of speciﬁc projects with clients. For example, tight
ontrol of knowledge assets through strict rules by legal depart-
ents, intended to ensure the patentability of future inventions,
an limit incentives to exchange and transfer knowledge and co-
evelop innovations by either KIBS ﬁrms or their clients (Alexy
t al., 2009; Leiponen, 2008). It must be acknowledged that an alter-
ative interpretation for the U-shaped association uncovered may
e some heterogeneity in ﬁrm behaviour between leading innova-
ors and followers (Arora et al., 2016). The explanation would be
hat leading innovators may  be more likely to stress formal appro-
riability mechanisms in order to prevent knowledge leakages, but
ay not value strongly innovation collaboration. Further empiri-
al investigation, however, indicated that this is unlikely to be the
ominant explanation driving the negative part of the estimated
ssociation for our sample of KIBS ﬁrms.10
This inverted U-shaped relation may  also hold for the relation
etween the importance of collaboration for all other partners
nd that of contractual appropriability mechanisms. Contractual
ppropriability mechanisms are regarded in the literature and by
ur own sample ﬁrms as the most important methods of captur-
ng value from innovation for KIBS (Leiponen, 2008; Miles et al.,
000). When used in modest amounts, contractual appropriability
echanisms appear to be very effective in the governance and con-
rol of innovation collaboration with external partners (Poppo and
enger, 2002). But high levels of emphasis on contractual appro-
riability mechanisms (e.g. by having very restrictive clauses on
xclusivity, excessive secrecy, or barriers to labour mobility, such
s non-compete clauses) may  be associated with less willingness
o undertake collaboration with external partners for innovation,
r act as a barrier to knowledge creation and transfer. Exces-
ive secrecy, complex conﬁdentiality agreements (difﬁcult due to
he intangibility of the service) and contracts limiting mobility of
mployees to competitors for a long period after they leave the
ompany, may  create suspicion and erect barriers to collabora-
ion with external organisations, such as competitors or research
rganisations (which could conceivably “poach” those valuable
igh-skilled professional employees).Third, our research sheds light on the importance for innovation
ollaboration by KIBS ﬁrms of formal, contractual and strate-
ic appropriability mechanisms. Besides the inverted U-shaped
10 Our regression results (column 2 in Table 4) show that the number of inno-
ations introduced by ﬁrms is positively associated with ﬁrms’ perception of the
mportance of innovation collaboration with clients (the coefﬁcient is about 0.005
f  we report the estimate up to 3 digits). Furthermore, we repeated the regression
using column 2 speciﬁcation in Table 4) adding an extra control variable ‘percentage
f  last year’s income from innovation’  as an additional proxy for innovation leadership.
he  regression results (not reported here) were in line with the existing ﬁndings,
.e.,  inverted U-shaped association between importance of innovation collaboration
ith clients and the importance of formal appropriability mechanisms). We also
btain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (p < 0.1) for the added vari-
ble.  The results suggest a positive association between KIBS ﬁrms’ innovativeness
nd the importance assigned to collaboration with clients for innovation.cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351
relations described above, we  also ﬁnd that innovation collabora-
tion with clients is more important when strategic appropriability
mechanisms are either of low or high importance. The ﬁnding that
achieving a favourable position in terms of specialised complemen-
tary assets, lead-time advantages and service design complexity
may  facilitate collaboration with clients to co-produce new service
offerings is well documented in the literature (Desyllas and Sako,
2013; Teece, 1986). Nevertheless, the ﬁnding that a low emphasis
on strategic appropriability mechanisms is associated with placing
high importance on collaboration with clients requires explanation.
It is possible that there may  be interaction effects, which could be
explored in further research. It may  be the case that, when the for-
mal  appropriability regime is relatively strong, innovators may  be
able to rely less heavily on strategic appropriability mechanisms.
The ﬁnding of the relation between higher R&D investments and
high importance of innovation collaboration with external part-
ners may  be interpreted in terms of the concept of absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms that are more active
in R&D may  be more capable of translating external knowledge
into internal capabilities, more knowledgeable about how to man-
age inter-organisational collaboration for innovation, and better
positioned to develop a more adequate appropriability strategy.
Thus, our theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that
innovation features that are “heightened” in KIBS ﬁrms, including
the continuous transfer of knowledge in collaboration with other
organisations (especially clients) and the reliance on highly-skilled
graduates, has to be accompanied by a careful strategy for protect-
ing the ﬁrm’s knowledge. Our study demonstrates the importance
of formal, contractual and strategic appropriablity in the context
of innovation collaboration for KIBS ﬁrms. It also may  suggest that
very high levels of emphasis on such mechanisms can undermine
the trust and reciprocity needed in (tacit) knowledge transfer or
complex development in innovation collaboration, or reduce incen-
tives to collaborate. We  conclude that KIBS ﬁrms need to be aware
that the choice of the type of appropriability mechanisms should
take into account the possible implications that such choices may
have on the capacity of the ﬁrm to exchange knowledge and col-
laborate for innovation with different external partners.
The ﬁndings from this study indicate that KIBS ﬁrms’ man-
agers should not overlook the important role of appropriability
mechanisms (including formal mechanisms, such as patents)
when collaborating for innovation, especially with clients. Admit-
tedly, the study set out to explore associations (and not causal
relationships) between appropriability strategy and innovation col-
laboration. Nevertheless, a possible interpretation of our ﬁndings
is that managers should account for the importance of collabora-
tive relationships (and with different partners) for the success of
an innovative project; and that this criterion should be an integral
part of the ﬁrm’s intellectual property strategy and management.
Our ﬁndings also have implications regarding the development
of a deeper understanding of innovation in services. Some KIBS
ﬁrms play central roles in innovation processes throughout the
economy, as sources of innovations, agents of transfer and diffu-
sion of knowledge, or innovation support for other sectors. Our
results pave the way for a better understanding of both inter-
organisational collaboration for innovation and the role of the
functioning of the intellectual property rights system for KIBS ﬁrms.
Finally, the results contribute to the understanding of ﬁrm
appropriability strategy and innovation collaboration, especially in
sectors where formal appropriability mechanisms (such as patents)
are regarded as playing a less important role in capturing rents from
innovation. The results also offer new insights on the choices of
appropriability mechanisms and innovation collaboration in sec-
tors where tacit knowledge exchanges, especially with clients, are
very frequent and important for innovation. This is ever more
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igniﬁcant, as manufacturing ﬁrms shift from selling products to
elling product-service systems (Neely, 2008).
. Limitations and future research
As with all empirical research, this study is subject to limitations,
nd these should be acknowledged. Our dependent and indepen-
ent variables focus on the perceived importance of organisational
ctions, processes and practices; we implicitly assume that this
s associated with actual organisational practices and behaviour.
here is some evidence of broad consistency between our sample
rms’ perceived importance of patents as means of value capture
rom innovation and their actual patenting activity. But the possi-
ility that the proxies only measure perceptions and mental models
f the interviewees of our sample ﬁrms, as opposed to reﬂecting the
rms’ actual behaviour, should be acknowledged.
In addition, ﬁrms that did not introduce any innovation between
009 and 2011 are excluded from the analysis. Thus, the paper
ddresses the relationship between appropriability mechanisms
nd innovation collaboration only for ﬁrms that have introduced
nnovations. We  acknowledge, however, that some ﬁrms might
ollaborate with external partners and use the various appropri-
bility mechanisms for the governance of the relationship but fail
o introduce innovations. We  can not comment on the role that
ppropriability mechanisms play in such a relationship.Further research, using different indicators and set in differ-
nt empirical contexts, is needed to strengthen conﬁdence in, and
eepen our ﬁndings. For instance, the role played by appropri-
bility mechanisms in innovation collaboration when ﬁrms fail
able A1
ssessing non-response bias using the characteristic comparison method.
Non-respondents 
Count
(Column percentage)
CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR INDEPENDENCE
Country
UK 314
(15.13%)
US 1761
(84.87%)
Total 2075
(100%)
Pearson chi2(1) = 94.466; p = 0.000
Industrial sector (2-digit SIC code)
48 118
(5.69%)
60 547
(26.36%)
62 136
(6.55%)
63 110
(5.30%)
67 264
(12.72%)
73 618
(29.78%)
87 159
(7.66%)
Others 123
(6.00%)
Total 2075
(100%)
Pearson chi2(7) = 10.770; p = 0.149
MEANS TEST COMPARISON
Firm size (the number of employees)
Observations 2075 
Mean 3897.15 
SE  448.62 
t(2296) = −4.3982; p = 0.000cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351 1349
to introduce innovations could be explored. Another possibility
is to explore whether KIBS leaders and followers have different
behaviour in terms of appropriability mechanisms and collabora-
tion for innovation (see Arora et al., 2016).
Moreover, future research needs to analyse further the under-
lying mechanisms that explain the distinctive patterns of ﬁrms’
appropriability strategies and innovation collaboration that this
study has uncovered. This is likely to require in-depth studies of
the ways in which ﬁrms make the strategic choices that we have
begun to unveil. Further studies could uncover in more detail the
characteristics, strengths and disadvantages of each of the differ-
ent types of appropriability mechanisms – formal, contractual and
strategic – in the context of KIBS ﬁrms when collaborating with
clients and other external partners.
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Respondents Total
Count
(Column percentage)
Count
(Column percentage)
92
(41.26%)
406
(17.67%)
131
(58.74%)
1892
(82.33%)
223
(100%)
2298
(100%)
12
(5.38%)
130
(5.66%)
45
(20.18%)
592
(25.76%)
15
(6.73%)
151
(6.57%)
11
(4.93%)
121
(5.27%)
21
(9.42%)
285
(12.40%)
85
(38.12%)
703
(30.59%)
22
(9.87%)
181
(7.88%)
12
(5.38%)
135
(5.87%)
223
(100%)
2298
(100%)
223
11968.21
3735.29
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Table A2
Number of granted patents per ﬁrm by “perceived patent signiﬁcance” class.
Perceived signiﬁcance of patents for value capture [1–5]
All sample US ﬁrms [1–2) [2–3) [3–4) [4–5]
Firm number 88 33 10 22 23
Mean  patent number 37.6 0.1 1.1 20.1 124.0
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otes: patents granted to sample US ﬁrms during the period 2007–2011 were colle
ppendix B. : Survey data quality
An implicit assumption inherent in our empirical measures of
he variables is that the perceived importance of organisational
ctions, processes and practices reﬂects, lead to, or at least are
ssociated with, actual organisational practices and behaviour.
owever, one should acknowledge the possibility that our proxies
nly measure perceptions and mental models by the interviewees
f our sampled ﬁrms as opposed to actual behaviour. In order to get
 sense of the possible differences between perceptions and actions,
e carried out a more detailed analysis of patenting behaviour in
rms. For this purpose, we collected information from the Derwent
atent database on the actual number of patents granted to our
ample US ﬁrms during the period 2007–2011 and compared it with
heir recorded scores of perceived signiﬁcance of patents as value
ppropriation mechanisms. As can be seen from Table A2, the aver-
ge number of patent grants is indeed monotonically increasing
ith the recorded score of perceived patent signiﬁcance, although
here is considerable variation in patent numbers across ﬁrms
ithin groups. Of course, one should not expect a one-to-one cor-
espondence between the reported patent signiﬁcance score and
he recorded number of patents, since a small number of patents
ay  have been critical to the capturing of returns from innovation.
o at least in the case of patenting, there seems to be a fair degree
f consistency between perceived importance and actual reliance
n patents. Furthermore, to assess common method bias arising
rom self-reported measures, we applied Harman’s (1967) one fac-
or test. Un-rotated factor analysis of variables that are used in the
nalysis resulted in 12 factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1,
hus common method bias can be regarded as insigniﬁcant in this
tudy (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).
eferences
lexy, O., Criscuolo, P., Salter, A., 2009. Does IP strategy have to cripple open
innovation? MIT  Sloan Manage. Rev. 51 (1), 71–77.
mara, N., Landry, R., Traore, N., 2008. Managing the protection of innovations in
knowledge-intensive business services. Res. Policy 37, 1530–1547.
ndersen, B., Howells, J., 2000. Intellectual property rights shaping innovation in
services. In: Andersen, B., Howells, J., Hull, R., Miles, I., Roberts, J. (Eds.),
Knowledge and Innovation in the New Service Economy. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK.
rora, A., Athreye, S., Huang, C., 2016. The paradox of openness revisited:
collaborative innovation and patenting by UK innovators. Res. Policy 45,
1352–1361.
rora, A., 1997. Patents, licensing, and market structure in the chemical industry.
Res. Policy 26, 391–403.
rundel, A., Kanerva, M.,  van Cruysen, A., Hollanders, H., 2007. Innovation Statistics
for the European Service Sector, INNO Metrics 2007 Report. European
Commission, DG Enterprise, Brussels.
udretsch, D.B., Bönte, W.,  Mahagaonkar, P., 2012. Financial signaling by
innovative nascent ventures: the relevance of patents and prototypes. Res.
Policy 41, 1407–1421.
ettencourt, L.A., Ostrom, A.L., Brown, S.W., Roundtree, R.I., 2002. Client
co-production in knowledge-intensive business services. Calif. Manage. Rev.
44,  100–128.
owling, A., 2002. Research Methods in Health. In Investigating Health and Health
Services, 2nd ed. Open University Press, Buckingham (Second edition).
assiman, B., Veugelers, R., 2002. Spillovers and R&D cooperation: some empirical
evidence. Am.  Econ. Rev. 92, 1169–1184.
hesbrough, H.W., 2003. Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and
Proﬁting from Technology. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.2.6 85.2 412.0
rom Derwent patent database.
Chesbrough, H.W., 2011. Open Services Innovation: Rethinking Your Business to
Grow and Compete in a New Era. Jossey Bass, San Francisco.
Cochran, W.G., 1977. Sampling Techniques, 3rd ed. Wiley, New York.
Cohen, W.M.,  Levinthal, D.A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: new perspective on
learning and innovation. Adm. Sci. Q. 35, 128–152.
Cohen, W.M.,  Nelson, R.R., Walsh, J., 2000. Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why  U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not).
NBER Working Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic Research, Boston,
MA.
David, M.,  Little, R., Samuhel, M.,  Triest, R., 1983. Nonrandom nonresponse models
based on the propensity to respond. Proceedings of the Business Economic
Statistical Section, 168–173.
Davies, A., 2004. Moving base into high-value integrated solutions: a value stream
approach. Ind. Corp. Change 13 (5), 727–756.
Desyllas, P., Sako, M.,  2013. Proﬁting from business model innovation: evidence
from Pay As You Drive auto insurance. Res. Policy 42, 101–116.
Doloreaux, D., Shearmur, R., 2012. Collaboration, information and the geography of
innovation in knowledge intensive business services. J. Econ. Geogr. 12 (1),
79–105.
Dyer, J.H., Singh, H., 1998. The relational view cooperative strategies and sources of
interorganizational competitive advantage. Acad. Manage. Rev. 23, 660–679.
Eisen, S.V., Schultz, M.R., Vogt, D., Glickman, M.E., Elwy, R., Drainoni, M.-L.,
Osei-Bonsu, P.E., Martin, J., 2012. Mental and physical health status and alcohol
and drug use following return from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Am. J.
Public Health 102 (S1), S66–S73.
European Commission, 2004. Employment in Europe 2004: Recent Trends and
Prospects. Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities,
Directorate-general for Employment and Social Affairs, Luxembourg.
Evangelista, R., 2000. Sectoral patterns of technological change in services. Econ.
Innov. New Technol. 9 (3), 183–222 (2000).
Fitjar, R.D., Rodríguez-Pose, A., 2013. Firm collaboration and modes of innovation
in  Norway. Res. Policy 42, 128–138.
Foray, D., 2004. Economics of Knowledge. The MIT  Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Gallouj, F., Weinstein, O., 1997. Innovation in services. Res. Policy 26 (4), 405–556.
Graham, S.J.H., Mowery, D.C., 2006. The use of intellectual property in software:
implications for open innovation. In: Chesbrough, H.W., Vanhaverbeke, W.,
West, J. (Eds.), Open Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Greenwood, R., Li, S., Prakash, R., Deephose, D., 2005. Reputation, diversiﬁcation
and organizational explanations of performance in professional service ﬁrms.
Organiz. Sci. 16 (6), 661–673.
Hagedoorn, J., Zober, A.-K., 2015. The role of contracts and intellectual property
rights in open innovation. Technol. Anal. Strateg. Manage. 27 (9), 1050–1067.
Hall, B.H., MacGarvie, M.,  2006. The private value of software patents. NBER
Working Paper No. 12195.
Hall, B.H., Helmers, C., Rogers, M.,  Sena, V., 2014. The choice between formal and
informal intellectual property: a review. J. Econ. Lit. 52 (2), 375–423.
Hansen, M.T., Nohria, N., Tierney, T., 1999. What’s your strategy for managing
knowledge? Harv. Bus. Rev. 77, 106–116.
Harman, H.H., 1967. Modern Factor Analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
IL.
Henkel, J., Schoberl, S., Alexy, O., 2014. How  and why ﬁrms adopt selective
revealing in open innovation. Res. Policy 43 (5), 879–890.
Hipp, C., 2008. Service peculiarities and the speciﬁc role of technology in service
innovation management. Int. J. Serv. Technol. Manage. 9 (2), 134–173.
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, P., Ritala, R., 2010. Protection for proﬁting from
collaborative service innovation. J. Serv. Manage. 21 (1), 6–24.
Jones, C., Hersteley, W.,  Fladmoe-Lindquist, J., Borgatti, S., 1998. Professional
service constellations: how strategies and capabilities inﬂuence collaborative
stability and change. Organiz. Sci. 9 (3), 396–410.
Kalton, G., Flores-Cervantes, I., 2003. Weighting methods. J. Off. Stat. 19 (2), 81–97.
Laursen, K., Salter, A., 2014. The paradox of openness: appropriability, external
search and collaboration. Res. Policy 43 (5), 867–878.
Lawton, L., Parasuraman, A., 1980. The impact of the marketing concept on new
product planning. J. Mark. 44 (1), 19–25.
Lehrer, M.,  Ordanini, A., DeFillippi, R., Miozzo, M.,  2013. Challenging the orthodoxy
of value co-creation theory: a contingent view of co-production in
design-intensive business services. Eur. Manage. J. 30, 499–509.
Leiponen, A., Byma, J., 2009. If you cannot block, you better run: small ﬁrms,
cooperative innovation and appropriation strategies. Res. Policy 38,
1478–1488.
h Poli
L
L
L
L
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
N
NM. Miozzo et al. / Researc
eiponen, A., 2008. Control of intellectual assets in client relationships:
implications for innovation. Strateg. Manage. J. 29, 1371–1394.
evin, R.C., Klevorick, A.K., Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1987. Appropriating the
returns from industrial research and development. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 3,
242–279.
iebeskind, J.P., 1997. Keeping organizational secrets: protective institutional
mechanisms and their costs. Ind. Corp. Change 6 (3), 623–663.
ove, J.H., Roper, S., Bryson, J.R., 2011. Openness, knowledge, innovation and
growth in UK business services. Res. Policy 40 (10), 1438–1452.
assini, S., Miozzo, M.,  2012. Outsourcing and offshoring of business services:
challenges to theory, management and geography of innovation. Reg. Stud. 46
(9), 1219–1242.
etcalfe, J.S., 1994. Evolutionary economics and technology policy. Econ. J. 104
(425), 931–944.
iles, I., Andersen, B., Boden, M.,  Howells, J., 2000. Service production and
intellectual property. Int. J. Technol. Manage. 20 (1/2), 95–115.
iles, I., 2005. Knowledge intensive business services: prospects and policies.
Foresight 7 (6), 39–63.
ina, A., Bascavusoglu-Moreau, E., Hughes, A., 2014. Open service innovation and
the ﬁrm’s search for external knowledge. Res. Policy 43 (5), 853–866.
iozzo, M.,  Grimshaw, D., 2005. Modularity and innovation in
knowledge-intensive business services: IT outsourcing in Germany and the UK.
Res. Policy 34 (9), 1419–1439.
iozzo, M.,  Grimshaw, D., 2011. Capabilities of large services outsourcing ﬁrms:
the  ‘outsourcing plus staff transfer model’ in EDS and IBM. Ind. Corp. Change
20  (3), 909–940.
iozzo, M.,  Soete, L., 2001. Internationalisation of services: a technological
perspective. Technol. Forecasting Social Change 67 (2), 159–185.
iozzo, M.,  Lehrer, M.,  DeFillippi, R., Grimshaw, D., Ordanini, A., 2012. Economies
of  scope through multi-unit skill systems: the organisation of large design
ﬁrms. Br. J. Manage. 23, 145–164.
eely, A., 2008. Exploring the ﬁnancial consequences of the servitization of
manufacturing. Oper. Manage. Res. 1 (2), 103–118.
elson, R., Winter, S.G., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
Belknap Press, Cambridge MA.cy 45 (2016) 1337–1351 1351
Pisano, G., Teece, D.J., 2007. How to capture value from innovation: shaping
intellectual property and industry architecture. Calif. Manage. Rev. 50,
295–1278.
Podsakoff, P.M., Organ, D.W., 1986. Self-report in organizational research:
problems and prospects. J. Manage. 12 (4), 531–544.
Poppo, L., Zenger, T., 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function
as  substitutes or complements? Strateg. Manage. J. 23 (8), 707–725.
Rogers, W.H., 1993. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Tech.
Bull.  13, 19–23.
Rothwell, R., Freeman, C., Jervis, P., Robertson, A., Townsend, J., 1974. SAPPHO
updated-project SAPPHO phase 2. Res. Policy 3 (3), 258–291.
Samuelson, P., 2010. What effects do legal rules have on service innovation. In:
Paul Maglio, P., Cheryl Kieliszewski, A., Sophorer, James C. (Eds.), Handbook of
Service Science. Springer, New York.
Shugart, M.S., Valdini, M.E., Suominen, K., 2005. Looking for locals: voter
information demands and personal vote-earning attributes of legislators under
proportional representation. Am.  J. Polit. Sci. 49 (2), 437–449.
Teece, D.J., 1986. Proﬁting from technological innovation: implications for
integration collaboration, licensing and public policy. Res. Policy 15, 285–305.
Tether, B., 2005. Do service ﬁrms innovate (differently)? Insights from the
European Innobarometer survey. Ind. Innov. 12 (2), 153–184.
Weinzimmer, L.G., Nystrom, P.C., Freeman, S.J., 1998. Measuring organizational
growth: issues, consequences and guidelines. J. Manage. 24 (2), 235–262.
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817–838.
Williams, R.L., 2000. A note on robust variance estimation for cluster-correlated
data. Biometrics 56, 645–646.
Wooldridge, J.M., 2000. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. South
Western College Publishing, Cincinnati, OH.
den Hertog, P., 2000. Knowledge-intensive business services as co-producers of
innovation. Int. J. Innov. Manage. 4 (4), 491–528.
von Hippel, E., von Krogh, G., 2006. Free revealing and the private-collective model
for innovation incentives. R&D Manage. 36, 295–306.
von Hippel, E., 1976. Dominant role of users in scientiﬁc instrument innovation
process. Res. Policy 5 (3), 212–239.
